ABSTRACT
In a crisis in the international settlement system, there is a need to strengthen payment discipline and accelerate payments. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic have also led to a reduction in the liquid means of transport organizations and also increased the problem. Acceleration of repayment of accounts receivable increases cash security. The methods of accounts receivable management integrated into the system based on a client-oriented approach are investigated. The proposed system allows you to track the balances of accounts receivable, comparing them with sales volumes and turnover indicators. The concept of the cycle of accounts receivable circulation is formulated. It is revealed that the existing indicators of turnover of accounts receivable and the volume of sales do not accurately reflect the quality of repayment of accounts receivable, the relationship between these indicators is not revealed. They do not disclose the possibility of additional release of funds from settlements with debtors. To solve this problem, a new indicator has been introduced - the rate of repayment of receivables. An approach is proposed to substantiate the expediency of accelerating payments based on the elasticity of revenue from the sale of transport services to the rate of repayment of receivables. © The Authors, published by EDP Sciences.
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has interrupted firms and their value networks. The lockdown measures taken by governments around the globe have triggered a massive supply and demand shock. The ensuing crisis has created economic chaos that resulted in massive business disruptions for companies, their customers, their suppliers, and their affiliated service providers (banks and logistics providers). Firms are turning to supply chain financing solutions to stabilize liquidity and their net working capital to maintain solvency and ensure continuity of supply through their supply chains. This paper discloses several different types of supply chain financing solutions and how these can impact firms and their value creation partners struggling through the uncertain business environment caused by a global pandemic. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
ABSTRACT
The implementation of measures to limit electricity consumption in many provinces of China has caused coal prices to rise irrationally, further aggravating the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain. Small and medium-sized enterprises lacking funds cannot effectively participate in the green transformation and development of the coal industry, which slows down the sustainable development process of the coal industry. Under the current background of low-carbon advocacy, blockchain technology can reasonably allocate resources and efficiently process information, thereby providing a solution for this financing problem. This paper first proposes a coal accounts receivable financing model based on blockchain technology, then builds a coal accounts receivable financing system dominated by ports through blockchain technology. Finally, the Stackelberg yield–benefit model is used to analyze the income function of each participant in the process of accounts receivable financing. The results show that the use of blockchain technology can reduce the financing condition of financial institutions and improve the maximum income of cooperative enterprises in the chain while solving the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises in the coal supply chain. This study provides practical significance and theoretical value for promoting the transformation and upgrading of coal enterprises and accelerating the opening of the sustainable development model of the coal industry.
ABSTRACT
Due to limited guarantees, it is difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain loans from banks. Supply chain accounts-receivable pledge financing (SCARPF) can help in overcoming those financing difficulties. This study developed an evolutionary game model of banks, core enterprises and SMEs in SCARPF, analyzed the evolution path and evolution rules of the model, and performed a numerical simulation. The results indicated that the result of the evolutionary game depends on the initial values of the variables. When certain conditions are met, the system will evolve to (lending, keep the contract). The higher the return rate during either normal production of SMEs, the loan interest rate or supply chain punishment, the more likely it is that banks will lend money and SMEs will keep the contract. However, the bank will only be likely to lend money, enabling SMEs to keep the contract, when the probability of core enterprises and SMEs engaging in joint loan fraud—or the proportion of the benefits that SMEs share when engaging in joint loan fraud—is reduced. The results of this study provide insights for banks, core enterprises, and SMEs in supply chain financing decisions, which is conducive to solving the financing difficulties of SMEs.